Mubei Therefore, even though the integration of the historical and dynamic methods of legal interpretation is not an absolute mistake, it is clearly a mistake in relation to the Continental understanding of legal interpretation and law, to which Lithuania should belong. Official Gazette,No. The doctrine of the separation of powers is not so impractical here. The latter, as something separate from the gap of law, is scarcely raised by the main authors discussed in this article; therefore, it will not be separately analyzed here.

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Kajim What distinguishes the method of legal interpretation from other methods of interpretation and other modes of thought analysis, analogy, comparisonis how the meaning of law specifically is determined, vaisvla to a specific legal interpretation.

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. But here the distinction between subjective and objective is nonsensical, because it is unclear what is meant by subjective intentions, since the subjective intentions of legislators are usually related to the creation and adoption of statutes and, further on, with the historical method of legal interpretation. How do we distinguish the appropriate facts, having legal significance, from the facts tieses our lives that a legislature specifically decided not to regulate — that are legally insignificant?

All of the main texts analyzed in this article are affected or over-affected by the allegedly Western conception of an interpretatively active court, opposing it to the Soviet conception of an interpretatively passive court. The former aspect -how hurried the process is — will be revealed on a broader scale in Parts 4 and 5 of this article.

Just as no judge may even choose between logic and alogic, every lawyer must be taught logic, but not the logical method of legal interpretation. Jurisprudencija 41 33 It cannot be that — real interpretation, as, for example, dynamic or alfosnas methods of interpretation. Alfonsas Vaisvilaa doctrine of the separation of powers is an ethical, but not a scientific ideology, and we should not ask if it is possible to turn that doctrine into reality, but what the principles of action of some institutions should be.

The outcome is that a democratic legislature creates teies law, the administration executes that law, and the judiciary applies that law to concrete cases. Do we not by stating why the true meaning of the legal norm is rational or well-founded, further construct the legal norm? It shows the difficulty of differentiation the logical method of legal interpretation.

These are the concerns of Parts 1, 4 and 5 of this article. First of all, as stated in Part 1, an ideology or a doctrine is questionable if it is based on quasi-oppositions proposed by the use of unexplained nonsubstantive adjectives or adverbs. News and Events Finally, very often the platform upon which the article builds is a book by Antonin Scalia: We may write books, dissertations, akfonsas articles using logic, analogy, and comparisons. The problem of differentiation is, also naturally, the problem of the definition of legal interpretation.

Another point is that social reality is also dynamic in relation to precedent law, but a very strange situation arises here — if you are a complete activist, you must abandon the doctrine of the stare decisis or at least substantially modify it, so that, after modification, it should say that the stare decisis applies, unless the social reality has evolved.

This is not the mechanical literalism, discussed above, as the literal method for Liekyte includes linguistic, grammatical and even systematic considerations see note teogija The mistake in this sequence of thinking is to go from vaisvilla and legislative mistakes directly to legislative intervention by the judiciary, as though it is the first or even the only possible course of action.

That is, the difference between legal interpretation and legal argumentation is unclear, and the nonsubstantive adjectives or adverbs or oppositions presupposed by them are used to define the concept of legal interpretation. We know that cases teofija often dismissed on the absence of grounds or a legal norm to be applied. Nevertheless, notwithstanding all these theoretical problems of dynamic interpretation or filling in the gaps of law, these activities, if teisew by a judiciary, are, strictly speaking, undemocratic.

Why should some cases be exempted from this tradition of practice and left for the judges to fill in in their absence?

The aim of legal interpretation is to reveal the real meaning of the legal norm applied. Even if on rare occasions a judge explicitly and openly applies the laws of logic — even that is not grounds for distinguishing the logical method of legal interpretation. That was the coming of the spirit of liberalism to this region. Izdatelstvo eksmo, [in Russian]. The phenomenon of a gap in the law is vaisviila understood as a consequence of more general motives — imperfection of the legislative process, caused by the workload of the legislator; working not with concrete cases, but abstract rules; and sometimes vague linguistic input.

The same with analogy—in the Schermers and Waelbroeck book we find a subsection, called Systematic Interpretation, Analogy see note In this case, the most precise and correct thing should be to distinguish the dynamic method of interpretation.

Although, systematic interpretation and analogy are distinguished in the title of the subsection, there are no signs of differentiation in the analysis presented.

Why then complain about systematic inconsistency in Lithuanian law? But that alfoneas a mistake precisely, because of the difficulty with reality, to conclude that we should devalue or even abandon the doctrine of the separation of powers by saying that the separation is, in fact, cooperation. These general laws of thinking are not attributed to legal interpretation onlybut to thinking in general.

Neville Brown with Tom Kennedy and some other authors see vxisvila. It is important to stress that this is a critical review. Perhaps, because logic is also in vaisvilla language, in our normal not the non compos mentis application of it? This circumstance presupposes the demand to supplement the conception of the object of environmental law violation by both human health and life and sustainable development categories.

Usually, the doctrine of the active court in these texts is not only the doctrine of the interpretatively active court, but also, as a consequence, the doctrine of the legislatively active court. See generally note 9: It rather disturbs or misleads the reader, especially if various ideologies are deducted from them. Related Posts


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