Maureen Sie Draft version to appear in: Caruso, G. Free Will, an Illusion? Many others regard the neuro-scientific findings as irrelevant to their views on free will. They do not believe that determinist processes are incompatible with free will to begin with, hence, do not understand why deterministic processes in our brain would be see Sie and Wouters , That latter response should be understood against the background of the philosophical free will discussion.
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In his pursuit of an account of free action, Frankfurt notices that the motives that may or may not lead us to act fall into two importantly distinct categories. On the one hand there are motives which are somehow alien, or external, to an agent. The question is how we should distinguish motives of the first sort from motives of the second. An account of identification will answer this question.
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Cambridge: CUP. Google Scholar Carlisle, C. Oxford: OUP. Google Scholar Dewey, J. Google Scholar Davidson, D. Clarendon Press: Oxford. Google Scholar Frankfurt, H. Google Scholar Ginet, C. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Google Scholar Pollard, B. London: Penguin. Google Scholar Shoemaker, D.
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Identification and externality
Propositional Attitudes in Philosophy of Mind. Pragmatism about Truth in Philosophy of Language. In such situations the person may well be morally responsible for what he chooses or does despite his inability to choose or to do otherwise. Harry G. Frankfurt, Identification and externality — PhilPapers We are not satisfied to think that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. Control and Responsibility in Meta-Ethics. Freedom and Liberty in Social and Political Philosophy.
Identification, Psychology, and Habits
Frankfurt on Identification
FRANKFURT IDENTIFICATION AND EXTERNALITY PDF